“I am rigged in a splendid suit of blue…”(1): Interpreting Richmond Depot Clothing from a Material Culture Paradigm

By Richard M. Milstead, Ph.D.

Introduction

The above quote from a letter written by Virginia Confederate Private Ted Barclay in 1863, expresses the sentiments of one veteran soldier on new uniform clothing issued to him and other enlisted men in his unit by the Confederate Army Quartermaster’s Department. This clothing was likely the product of the central government clothing manufactory operated in downtown Richmond officially known as the Richmond Clothing Bureau (RCB). The color reference is to imported English blue- gray, wool kersey, commonly referred to then as English “army cloth,” (Figure 1) as compared to the faded, tan color (“butternut”) of most logwood dyed domestic wool-on-cotton fabrics produced by Virginia textile mills after extended use in the field.

Recent studies of original garments produced by the RCB have included comparative analysis of eighteen different uniform jackets, six pairs of pants, two pairs of drawers and a shirt attributable to that operation, manufactured, it is estimated, as early as the third quarter of 1862 through as late as the first quarter of 1865.(2) Some came with provenances that associated them with specific soldiers and others with battles or events during the conflict. As a single physical artifact, each tells a unique story associated with its own history and the context in which it was used.(3) In the past, most studies of Civil War soldier’s uniform clothing have largely focused on stylistic details or each item’s history of ownership. However, of this group of artifacts it can be said that, viewed collectively, they represent one aspect of the material culture of both the place and era from which they came. Reflecting on such historic pieces as a group through the paradigm of material culture studies is relatively recent, having been pioneered by researcher Leslie D. Jensen’s “groundbreaking” work in 1989.(4)

What are “material culture studies?” One “dictionary definition” of material culture and its study is:

“The scholarly analysis of material culture, which can include both human-made and natural or altered objects, is called material culture studies. It is an interdisciplinary field and methodology that tells of the relationships between people and their things: the making, history, preservation, and interpretation of objects [emphasis author’s.] It draws on both theory and practice from the social sciences and humanities such as art history, archaeology, anthropology, history, historic preservation, folklore, archival science, literary criticism, and museum studies, among others.”(5)

A simpler, less academic, way of saying this is studying the context of human-made objects. That is, who owned and used them and why? Who made them and how? What were they made from and when? What distinguishes them from other similar artifacts? What effect did the society (culture) in which they were made have on their form or how they were used? What affect did they have on the society (culture) that made and used them? What did those who owned/used them think or say about them? What is said about them now? What was their value (monetarily and intrinsically) then and what is it now?

This paper will reflect upon this grouping of products from the RCB using the constructs of such an analysis.

The “Manufacturing Model”

How these original garments were produced is significant, as is the context in which that production occurred. The RCB started manufacturing uniforms and other clothing as part of the Confederate Army Quartermaster’s Department in the city of Richmond in the late second or early third quarter of 1861. Its production model was based upon a pre-war system used for over fifty years prior to the start of the Civil War at the Federal Government’s Schuylkill Arsenal in Philadelphia for making clothing for the U.S. Army. In a letter to Inspector General S. Churchill in 1853, Major George Crosman, commanding officer at the Army Office of Clothing and Equipage in Philadelphia (Schuylkill Arsenal), described the Arsenal’s process for manufacture of army enlisted men’s clothing as:

“The chief duties of the Clothing Establishment are to receive and receipt to the Military Storekeeper …. all materials for making Clothing, except Leather, and to have the same cut out by the required patterns [which are] then [provided] to the women, who are employed for the purpose, …. to be made up by the piece, according to the rates of a fixed tariff of prices….

In issuing out materials for Clothing to be made by the piece, outside the walls of the Arsenal, a ticket is prepared and given to the women by the Superintendent, …. having upon it, the No., date, and the quantity and description of the garments issued, which ticket is presented to the Inspector, after the Clothing is made, in order that, if the latter passes inspection, …. [the ticket] is then taken back to the Superintendent, who fills up the blank printed receipt…. with the proper amount of money for the work. The receipt is then signed by the woman and presented to the proper person for payment ….”

In fixing a Tariff of prices for making Clothing, there are some articles …. requiring fine and neat work, for which a higher rate, in proportion, is allowed, than for some other articles, and hence, …. there is frequently a competition among the women for these articles…”(6)

The organizers and future managers of the RCB came from related civilian enterprises (tailors, dry goods merchants, etc.) not from a military tradition. In a November 1862 letter, Captain William Ferguson, a manager at the RCB, indicated that 100 Assistant Quartermasters and clerks were then working there along with 60 full time cutters preparing the garments for assembly.(7) By August 1863 the number of cutters had been increased further reflecting growth in production requirements at the clothing manufactory.(8) The largest part of its workforce were residents (primarily women) of the Richmond community operating from home, something like a “cottage Industry,” assembling the garments from the pre-cut pieces provided by the RCB. The number of assembly workers employed rose throughout the war from approximately two thousand in late 1862 to as many as four thousand in 1864.(9) At the start of the war this workforce, unlike that at the Schuylkill Arsenal, came to the job without experience in making military clothing. Many were work-at-home seamstresses who had made garments only for their family and relatives. They were motivated, at least in part, by patriotism. By the end of the war, most of these workers were female relatives of soldiers, often in active service, disabled, or deceased, who were relying on their handwork to eke out a subsistence wage, very much like their “sisters” employed at the same time by Union Quartermasters in Philadelphia.(10)(11)

The supply chain needed for the RCB to operate basically was derived from peacetime enterprises attuned to the civilian marketplace. Analogous to Northern business, many Southern entrepreneurs who supported the army’s clothing production activities achieved success (and wealth) directly employing hundreds of additional workers making needed production supplies and facilitating distribution of the RCB’s output to the army. Following passage of the “Conscription” Act in 1862,(12) as the war progressed work force demands often led to increased use of women, children, and enslaved persons even in businesses that had not traditionally utilized those elements of the labor force.(13) Also like their Northern counterparts, some of these business owners were accused of price gouging and other “unpatriotic” activities in their contracts with the Quartermaster’s Department.(14) Ultimately, with the end of the conflict, many continued to prosper within the Richmond community, and some of the establishments are still in existence today.(15)

Over the years of the conflict, the RCB not only grew, but matured and adapted in the face of a changing environment into a large operation providing serviceable clothing for the army. Researchers have divided war era Confederate uniform production into roughly three separate periods, early (April 1861 to October 1862), mid-War (November 1862 through the mid-1864 timeframe) and late-War (mid 1864 to April 1865).(16) While these are somewhat crude delimitations, they do suggest transitions seen both in the Richmond Depot enlisted men’s uniform clothing provided as the war progressed and to the RCB’s manufacturing operations producing it. These transitions were caused to some degree by external pressures on the Confederate war effort and represented the Quartermaster’s Department responses to them.(17) The RCB was one of several “Clothing Bureaus” established across the Confederacy to meet the needs of its soldiers.(18) It operated continuously between the second quarter of 1861 and the end of the war, closing its doors with the fall of Richmond in April 1865. Ultimately, the uniforms produced there were in a sense emblematic of General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) being widely issued throughout the war to most of its enlisted men.

Character of the Clothing Produced

It was through systematic study of this group of original examples, but mainly from the uniform jackets because of the relatively large number of those analyzed, that most insight was gained. The design of the clothing expressed elements of period military and civilian style. It both reflected and influenced the types of textiles and other supplies used to make the garments. It was noted how similar the jackets are but, at the same time, how each was individually different, very much mirroring both the people who made them and the soldiers who wore them. Uniform production was anything but “mass production” in the 20th/21st Century sense but, nevertheless, hundreds of thousands of jackets, trousers, drawers, and shirts were produced for issue by Confederate Army Assistant Quartermasters (AQMs) in the field. The jackets and trousers were made from domestically produced woolen fabrics, woven in Virginia mills with yarn spun from local sheep’s wool and cotton “warps” produced both in Virginia and North Carolina. Textiles produced in England and “run” through the blockade were also used, becoming increasingly more important in the last eighteen months of the conflict. The shirts, drawers, and uniform linings were made of southern cotton woven mainly in Petersburg and the RCB used millions of wooden buttons made in the carpentry shop of two Scottish immigrants just a few blocks up Cary Street from the Clothing Bureau’s location in the heart of the city.(19)

The small differences between individual jackets or trousers, “anomalies” highlighted in the studies’ analysis, appear to largely be representative of the individual background and capabilities of the pieceworkers who assembled them, so called “seamstress choice” variations. Sometimes these variations were partially in response to the character of the textiles they were working with, were enabled by the patterns used for pre-cut pieces supplied to them for assembling the garments or may even have been because of abnormalities in the “kits” they received (e.g., too few buttons included with the kit.) Mainly, however, they resulted from the individuality of the pieceworkers themselves. In some cases, post issue modifications were also encountered where the individuality of the owner was displayed with the addition of a second pocket, tailoring for better fit, or even substitution of a warmer lining.

Focusing on the jackets, the objective of the comparative study was initially to answer the question of what details made a Richmond Depot (RD) jacket distinguishable as such. All of the examples answered that question to some degree, but the group fell short of providing a definitive new set of absolute criteria beyond the original ones first described by Jensen.(20) All RD jackets used the same six panel “wrapper” pattern for the body pieces derived from mid-19th century tailored civilian dress and frock coats.(21) (Figure 2) They used a two-piece sleeve pattern derived from the same sources, styled with a moderately wide sleeve at the elbow and a narrow, non-opening cuff. Of all Confederate “shell” jackets, they are among those exhibiting a reasonably stylish cut from a period perspective. A similar story appears to also be true with the more limited set of trousers studied.

Unfortunately, the pattern itself is not the whole story. The patterns for the jackets, trousers, drawers, and shirts made by the RCB were developed by the same civilian tailors and dry goods merchants who first managed it. Pattern creation in the middle of the 19th Century for civilian coats and trousers was done in an almost mechanical way by individual tailors, using standard torso measurements taken from their customer, through very nearly mathematical layout methods. Adjustments for final fit and stylish appearance were in the realm of the tailor’s “art,” so patterns were usually created for each customer individually.(22) The same basic coat and trouser patterns were almost universally used in the preceding two decades. As a result, many other Civil War military jackets, both Confederate and Union, were based upon the same conceptual pattern that the RCB used. The patterns for shirts and drawers, as undergarments, enjoyed far less stylistic scrutiny. In fact, the shirt pattern they used had been commonly employed for over a century before the Civil War began and was only beginning to change significantly in the civilian world as it ended.(23)

Implementation of the basic jacket pattern from an assembly perspective is evidenced through steps like setting the lining or sleeves into the body or how details like collars, epaulets, facings, or pockets were constructed. Consistency in these came closer to distinguishing RCB made jackets, in that, nearly all jackets and trousers studied were constructed in much the same way. For reasons that are not completely understood, however, a few did exhibit variations (“anomalies”) in execution of these steps as well. Attempts to explain or rationalize them were speculative. In fact, some implementation details like the number of buttons on the front varied significantly enough from the standard that they become almost inconsequential in attribution of a jacket to the RCB. There was no explanation for this either.

The construction details and handwork execution in almost all the clothing studied reflected what can be termed a “quick but efficient and competent” philosophy. This was very noticeable when compared the meticulous workmanship usually seen in professionally tailored civilian garments of the period. In some cases, care was taken to provide extra stitching or reinforcements such as the inclusion of “bar tacks” at stress points. In other cases, construction details that were extraneous to what was needed for basic assembly were eschewed. Depending on the relative competence of the pieceworker in some specific procedures, like finishing buttonholes, the quality of the workmanship varied significantly as well. Interestingly, some of the more meticulous handwork observed appears on the two pairs of drawers and the shirt studied despite their being the simplest in pattern and execution.

A surprising number of the studied jackets exhibited some amount of machine stitching in their construction. The reason this was surprising is that, heretofore, the general assumption made by researchers was that clothing produced by the RCB was entirely hand sewn. Part of this may come from the fact that Schuylkill Arsenal did not allow its pieceworkers to use sewing machines in construction of its garments.(24) Also, the assumed nature of the workforce employed by the RCB suggested that the cost of such technology would be prohibitive for them either to obtain or maintain. While it was speculated that machine sewing might indicate small tailoring shops or other commercial enterprises participated in uniform assembly, the presence of machine sewing in statistically significant numbers (three) in the jackets examined (eighteen) would tend to mitigate this as the only explanation.(25)

The textiles used in the garments were a focus throughout these studies. Understanding this critical component of RCB made clothing as well as its sources provided insight into the overall supply chain supporting the manufacturing operation.(26) The fabrics used also were integral to dating the artifacts themselves. Early in the war, when the RCB operations were formulative, a great deal of diversity was noted in the fabrics procured for its production. By the middle of 1862, the Quartermaster’s Department operation in Richmond was standardizing its domestic textile sources reducing this. By the beginning of 1864 incursion of Federal forces in Virginia affected raw materials availability and also closed or destroyed small regional woolen mills, impacting the supply of domestic uniform fabric. This resulted in increased reliance upon English woolen textiles in the latter period of the war, ultimately necessitating more government control of cargoes aboard blockade runners. However, the presence of “English goods” in some of the earliest mid-war examples studied clearly illustrates that they were part of the mix used throughout the conflict.(27)

A lot of significance is ascribed to the wooden buttons made at the Richmond carpentry shop of John and George Gibson. In the period between October 1862 and January 1865 the Gibsons’ shop produced 13.5 million wooden buttons in three sizes to be used on RCB clothing. In one sense, their presence on certain jackets, trousers, drawers, and the lone shirt examined was seminal in their attribution to the RCB. However, the story of the Gibson’s activities becomes anecdotally significant to understanding the role of small Virginia based manufacturing operations in RCB production as well as the important part procurement of these simple components played in their supply chain.(28) Large numbers of bone buttons were also made for the RCB by the Union Manufacturing Company of Richmond,(29) while sizable shipments of English metal buttons (military and common shirt and pant sizes) that came through the blockade at Wilmington, NC(30) were significant as well. Even sewing thread, made principally in England, was run through the blockade, obtained locally either from Richmond dry goods concerns and importers or purchased directly by Confederate agents oversees for the Quartermaster’s Department use.

What did the Soldiers Think? – the user’s view of the value/worth of the garments

Based upon the many pictures taken of “proud privates” wearing their RCB made jackets, the soldiers took pride in their new government “duds” as symbols of their service and patriotism (Figure 3.) However, like their Union army counterparts, during their service not all recipients of the Confederate Quartermaster’s Department products viewed them altogether positively. Necessity and limitations in the raw material supplies available to make them, along with the “startup” nature of Confederate uniform manufacturing, especially in the first year and a half of the war, meant the garments were made to “lesser” quality standards as viewed by some of their owners when compared with civilian clothing. Shortly after the war, in 1866, Lt. James F.J Caldwell, a veteran of the 1st South Carolina Infantry which served in the ANV, wrote of the enlisted men’s issue clothing:

“The quality was more to be complained about than the quantity. [The uniform cloth] was coarse, stiff, and flimsy…[and] the cut was the worst of all. Anybody could put on the clothing, but scarcely any object in nature, except for a flour barrel, would fit it…. most of the men rubbed out a jacket in two or three months, a pair of pantaloons in one!”(31)

Of particular note seems to have been the rough domestic wool-on-cotton fabrics the RCB used for making jackets and trousers, particularly early in the war. Often viewed as “poor man’s” or even “slave cloth” in the South, such textiles were favored because of the limited raw fleece wool supplies available and were the primary “woolen” textiles produced by Virginia mills for uniform manufacture well into the third year of the conflict. In the war’s last eighteen months when imported English, all wool textiles were abundant enough to become the primary fabrics used in jackets and trousers, the view of the quality changed. For example, Captain Robert Funkhouser of the 49th Virginia Infantry Regiment stated that in November 1863, "Our troops are receiving quite a quantity of clothing and shoes. Clothing of good quality."(32) Field clothing issue records for the 49th Virginia document that on 30 November 1863 2nd Lieutenant Richard J. Reid, acting AQM for that regiment, oversaw a large uniform clothing distribution which included “219 English [wool] grey jackets, 242 pairs pants, 170 pairs drawers, and 264 ‘fair’ shirts.”(33) As noted at the beginning of this paper, Ted Barclay, a member of the 2nd Virginia Infantry Regiment in the famous Stonewall Brigade, also wrote positively about his newly issued uniform in a letter home stating, “the brigade secured a supply of English [wool] clothes… I am rigged in a splendid suit of blue.”(34)

From surviving records of his 1864-1865 clothing issues, Maryland artilleryman Charles Tinges, whose jacket was one of those studied, paid $14 for jackets he received in 1864, $12 for a pair of trousers and $3 for some drawers, obtaining yet another jacket in 1865 taken home after the war as a memento of his service. Had he acquired one in 1864, a cotton shirt would have cost him $3 as well. Each enlisted man was given an $85 allowance for clothing he received each year, and his pay was docked when what he received exceeded that amount. That same private received $11 per month in wages at the beginning of the war, but after June 1864 that was raised to $18 so Tinges’ jackets were almost equivalent in cost to a month of his salary.

If the soldier drew less that his allotment, the remainder was remanded to him in his pay at the end of the year. Some enlisted men avoided replacing worn items so they could, instead, receive the equivalent cash. 0thers even sold the clothing they received. Richmond resident J. B. Jones recorded in his diary in November 1864 that he bought two shirts “of a woman in Richmond who gets her supplies from passing soldiers…I paid $15 each; the price for new ones, of inferior quality, is $50 a peace.”(35) In a February 1865 report to a Confederate Congressional committee, Quartermaster General Alexander Lawton commented on “the soldiers’ improvidence in taking care of their clothing and bartering it off to civilians, traders, and others.”(36) The committee’s final report concluded that, in part because of such behavior, “large quantities of government clothing [is] possessed by persons in civil life and dealers in such articles.”

RCB clothing’s impact on the army and contemporary society then and the myths about it since

During the last three years of the conflict, the RCB’s products importance to sustaining Confederate forces in the Virginia theater of war was significant. Starting in October 1862, following repeal of the 1861 act establishing the commutation system,(38) the Quartermaster’s Department assumed primary responsibility for provisioning the entire Confederate Provisional Army and RCB manufactured clothing become the de facto standard provided to troops operating in Virginia.(39) In field service, clothing was an expendable commodity and constant replenishment was necessary to the success of Lee’s army. Certainly, without a supply system that administered large issues of these garments to his army, its operations would have been severely hampered.(40) However, in many war– time communications, Lee lamented the lack of “adequate” supplies to clothe his “needy” troops.

Where chronic shortages were often claimed to have existed, notably in blankets, overcoats, and shoes, each resulted from specific difficulties for their procurement within the Confederacy. In 1861 limitations to woolen textile production due to the Southern mill infrastructure when the war began, meant that to adequately clothe early volunteers, the largest portion of the fabrics produced were utilized for basic uniform production (i.e., coats and trousers.) As a result, overcoats could only be produced in limited numbers. In addition, very few mills in Virginia had the wide looms required for making blankets. Leather production was largely only through local operations as was shoe making. In 1862 production of the heavy weight woolen fabrics for overcoats and blankets was further limited by failures of the Eastern wool crop that year(41) combined with Union control of major sections of the Mississippi River starting that summer disrupting transportation of supplies between wool producing regions in Texas and the garment manufacturing centers in Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia.(42) The impact of conscription of skilled white workers, also beginning in 1862, stressed the textile mills, despite some exemptions ultimately provided by law, but severely impacted shops producing shoes by reducing the experienced workmen needed to make them. This, in turn, resulted in the extensive use of “conscripted men” detailed from the army itself to augment shoe manufacture as local shops could no longer sustain required production.(43) As the war progressed the Quartermaster’s Department increasingly depended upon cargos brought through the blockade to provide shoes and shoe leather, blankets, and ready-made overcoats for the armies. Not until 1864, however, did the government institute strict measures to effectively control deliveries of materiel for the war effort through that channel.(44)

Based upon period documentation, the overall quantities of soldier’s clothing issued to Lee’s army appear to have been adequate, however, and do not suggest serious shortages in most items. In his 1865 report to the Confederate Congress, Lawton stated that government Quartermaster clothing issues between 1 July 1864 through 31 January 1865 to Lee’s army in Virginia alone equaled 104,199 uniform jackets, 140,570 pairs of uniform trousers, 157,727 cotton shirts, 21,063 flannel shirts and 170,139 pairs of drawers, most of which were made at the RCB clothing manufactory.(45) In the same report, he indicated that 74,851 blankets, 167,862 pairs of shoes, and 4861 overcoats were also issued, some portion of which were run through the blockade.(46) Over the same period, the ANV’s strength never exceeded 63,000 enlisted men.(47) These numbers confirm that field issues of even blankets and shoes were substantial late in the war. More recently, extensive research into field clothing issues for many ANV regiments shows that the level of supply by the Quartermaster’s Department during the middle of the war was also quite up to the task despite common perceptions both then and now.(48)

The impact upon the population and commerce of Richmond from uniform production at the RCB was clearly significant as well. As discussed above, that operation employed thousands of Richmond residents directly and contracted with many large and small enterprises in and around the city for supplies required in its garment production. It became one of the economic “engines” within Virginia during the era. Over the course of the war, rough estimates of between three hundred and four hundred thousand total uniform jackets and, at least, half million each of trousers, shirts, and drawers were manufactured for the army by this operation on Cary Street in downtown Richmond and the upwards of 4000 “pieceworkers” they employed assembling garments.

Today, less that forty examples of RCB produced uniform jackets and not more than a dozen pairs of uniform trousers are thought to exist in museum and private collections around the country. Only two pairs of drawers and one shirt definitely attributable to their production have been identified. These relics are now monetarily worth many thousands of times what Private Tinges and others were charged for them in 1865. More to the point, today they provide an irreplaceable “window” into the life and times of the people who used and produced them.

However, in the century and a half since the conflict ended, the context in which clothing worn by Confederate soldiers is viewed has also changed. After the war, the myths and misrepresentations promoted by southern apologists through the “Lost Cause” narrative revised the image of the Confederate soldier. As pointed out by Jensen in 1989, investigations into what the ‘typical’ Confederate soldier wore and how it was produced were largely stymied until the last decades of the 20th Century:

“[R]esearch in this area has been [negatively] affected by a school of thought that contends that Confederate resources were uniformly inadequate to meet the army’s needs and that what Johnny Reb did receive in the way of clothing came overwhelmingly from the home folks…Out of this school came the emphasis on the ‘ragged rebel’.”(49)

The “Lost Cause” narrative was actively promoted by some ex-Confederate leaders in the South initially for political reasons but was embraced by a large segment of the southern population in the final decades of the 19th Century, especially the sons and daughters of the veterans. Jensen further notes:

“For southern apologists not only was the ‘ragged rebel’ appealing as a staunch individualist fighting for his independence despite a lack of almost everything with which to do it, he also served as a plausible explanation for Confederate defeat. The more ragged…he was, the more glorious his victories…”(50)

This stereotype was contradicted in the writings of some Confederate veterans who, like Caldwell above, reflected on the fact that clothing was generally available in adequate quantities and while occasionally conditions resulting from poor supply line logistics or extended active campaigning led to “ragged” garments, this was no more frequent that experienced by “Yankee” soldiers under similar situations. Jensen quotes W.W. Blackford, an officer on Confederate Major General JEB Stuart’s staff who writing in War Years with J.E.B. Stuart (New York 1945) who states:

"...In books written since the war, it seems to be the thing to represent the Confederate soldier as being in a chronic state of starvation and nakedness. During the last year of the war this was partially true, but previous to that time it was not any more than falls to the lot of all soldiers in an active campaign. Thriftless men would get barefooted and ragged and waste their rations to some extent anywhere, and thriftlessness is found in armies as well as at home. When the men came to houses, the tale of starvation, often told, was the surest way to succeed in foraging... "(51)

Unfortunately, the “ragged rebel” myth has been propagated long enough and consistently enough that today much of the public and even many modern historians, both South and North, continue to believe it. Rather than viewing many surviving examples of Confederate soldier’s clothing, such as the ones in these studies, as the products of large, organized, government managed production operations, they still are portrayed as the handy work of the soldier’s wives, mothers, and other female relatives on the “home front.” When Private Tinges’ jacket was acquired by its present owner, papers accompanying it from Tinges family included a card with the following written description:

“The jacket was made by his family all by hand. As there were no sewing machines or factories to do this also the lining was made by hand on a loom. The buttons are very valuable so I didn’t cut any of them off…If you don’t want to keep it return it to me and I shall put it in the Maryland Historical Society’s collection.”

Tinges jacket was one of literally tens of thousands made at the RCB of high-quality, all wool, English fabric, “run” through the blockade by the hundreds of thousands of yards during the war and its lining made from heavy weight cotton “osnaburg,” millions of yards of which were made in three Petersburg mills for use in army garment production. While that example was indeed hand sewn, as discussed above, other surviving examples attributed to the RCB exhibit machine sewing in their construction as well. Nevertheless, stories like that of Tinges’ jacket accompany many of these rare specimens becoming part of “their story,” obscuring under the shadow of “Lost Cause” mythology the role of Confederate industry and activities of the Quartermaster’s Department during the Civil War in providing materiel needed for the Southern war effort.(52)

Conclusion

Considered in context, garments manufactured through the Richmond Clothing Bureau during the Civil War illustrate that the Confederate Army Quartermaster’s Department, supported by Southern industry, succeeded in large-scale clothing production to support their field armies. From period accounts, the soldier’s clothing provided to Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, if not abundant, was generally sufficient both in quantity and quality. This was especially true in the last two years of the war despite major obstacles created by disruptions to raw material supplies and by Federal activities in the Virginia region.

The garments themselves were within both civilian and military norms and were executed competently, in line with the production models used both in the North and South during the period. While individual examples display minor variations in execution, as a group they evidence significant consistencies in pattern and construction.

Unfortunately, in the century and a half since the end of the conflict, the size and success of the government’s “Clothing Bureau” operation on Cary Street in Richmond and the impact it had between 1861 and 1865 on the society (culture) of that city as well as in provisioning the military forces in the northern Virginia region has been largely overlooked.

Endnotes

1. Barclay, Ted and Charles W. Turner, Liberty Hall Volunteers: Letters from the Stonewall Brigade, Natural Bridge Station, Va. (Rockbridge Pub. Co. 1992,) 83 (Afterward Barclay Letters.)

2. Milstead, Richard M., “Richmond Depot Jackets – Characteristics, Anomalies, and Myths,” The Liberty Rifles, March 2018, <https://www.libertyrifles.org/research/uniforms-equipment/richmond-jackets>, Milstead, Richard M., “Richmond Depot Clothing– Volume II, Characteristics and Anomalies: More Jackets, Pants, Drawers, and Shirts,” The Liberty Rifles, May 2021, <https://www.libertyrifles.org/research/uniforms-equipment/richmond-clothing>.

3. Milstead, Richard M., “The Tale of Two Jackets - Examination of two jackets made by the Richmond Clothing Bureau in the spring of 1864,” Military Collector & Historian, Volume 69, No. 2, (Summer 2017) 99 – 110.

4. Jensen, Leslie D., “A Survey of Confederate Central Government Quartermaster Jackets – Part 1”, Military Collector & Historian, Volume XLI No. 3 (Fall 1989), 110-111. (Afterward Jensen Part 1) Les Jensen’s landmark two-part study (incl. Part 2, Vol XLI No. 4) not only first defined the characteristics of “Richmond Depot” jackets but also those of other CS Clothing Bureaus which produced enlisted men’s uniforms during the conflict based upon surviving examples in public and private collections. His articles pioneered comparative study of such artifacts, using evaluation of their characteristics and their provenance to link them to the specific manufacturing centers in the Confederacy which produced them. In effect, Jensen’s research was the first published attempt to use modern “material culture” methodologies to study Confederate enlisted men’s uniforms. After over 30 years, the conclusions of his research remain largely validated and have been the foundation for academic study of Civil War Uniforms since.

5. “Material culture,” The Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia, last edited 13 January 2022, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Material_culture>. This definition was based upon Sheumaker, Helen; Wajda, Shirley, Material Culture in America: Understanding Everyday Life. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2008, xi–xii, and "Material Culture." Encyclopedia of Identity, edited by Ronald L. Jackson, vol. 1, SAGE Reference, 2010, 436-439.

6. Letter Major George Crosman to Inspector General S. Churchill, 4 January 1853, C-15 1853, Letters Received, Record Group (RG) 94, Records of the Adjutant General, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) Washington D.C.

7. Letter Captain William G. Ferguson to Mr. W. Donald [Editor of Richmond Whig], 18 November 1862, Service Records for W. G. Ferguson, Compiled Service Records of Confederate General and Staff Officers and Non-Regimental Enlisted Men, National Archives Microfilm Publication (NAMP) M331 Roll 0092, War Department Collection of Confederate Records (WDCCR) RG 109, NARA, Washington, D.C. (Afterward Ferguson letter to the Whig.)

8. Richmond Daily Dispatch, (Cowardin & Hammersley Publishers. Richmond, VA) (Afterward Richmond Daily Dispatch),24 August 1863. A notice published by the Quartermaster’s Department stated “Capt. Weisiger [officer in charge of the clothing manufactory department] of the Confederate Clothing Bureau, in order to accommodate the hundreds of ladies who work for his department, has so remodeled his establishment as to facilitate the delivery of work, and to prevent the employees from having to wait for hours at a time. Besides increasing his “Cutters,” he has duplicated the delivery office, the receiving office, and the pay office, so that the ladies are promptly attended to, and spared the mortification of lounging about the doors day and night”

9. The exact number of pieceworkers employed at the RCB is difficult to precisely access at any point in the war. Most information is derived anecdotally from letters and newspaper reports. The number also vacillated with raw material (mainly textile) availability. In his letter to the Whig, Captain Ferguson said that 2000 workers were employed making clothing there for the army. (Ferguson letter to the Whig.) Writing in April of 1863, Major Richard Waller, commander of the RCB, said that workforce size was not the limiting factor in his production but rather it was the availability of woolen fabric for constructing the uniforms. (Letter Major Richard Waller to Quartermaster General A.C. Myers, 24 April 1863; Records of the Quartermaster Department, NAMP M410, WDCCR RG 109, NARA). After domestic textile manufacturing increased, and greater volumes of imported goods were received through the blockade starting in the second half of 1863, the production output rose implying comparable expansion in the workforce. By the end of 1863 local newspaper articles suggested that the workforce totaled over three thousand and in 1864 reported that as many as an additional three thousand women were seeking employment at the clothing bureau (Richmond Daily Dispatch, 5 November 1863, and 13 May 1864). These numbers likely exclude ‘helpers’ (children, adult female relatives, or enslaved household servants) who assisted the women “ticket holders” in actually assembling the garments. Based upon the Schuylkill Arsenal’s comparable operations, the actual number of “needles” at work could be as much as 1.5 to 2.5 times the number holding tickets to receive work.

10. Ibid., Local matters, 22 July 1863, “Needle Women find great difficulty, at this time in earning a scant subsistence, owing to the high prices of all the necessaries of life, and the small wages they have to labor for. The Confederate clothing depot is furnishing work to many worthy ladies but judging from the continuous crowds of females around its doors at all hours, many of them have to make heavy sacrifices of time to procure that work... Will not the officers in charge give the matter their attention, and thus benefit a large class of deserving females?”

11. Morris, Elizabeth, "The Story of a Seamstress Who Laid Down her Needle and Became a Strawberry Girl”, The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 15, Issue 92, (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Co. June 1865), 673-680. “I cannot tell why the price of everything we eat or drink or wear has so much increased during the last year or two… — doubling and trebling the price of whatever the community required, except[for] the single item of the sewing-Woman’s labor… Every article of [Army] clothing which the sewing-woman makes commands a higher price than formerly, yet she receives much less for her work than when it [previously] sold for a lower one…[This] reduction coming contemporaneously with an unprecedented rise in the price of all the necessaries of life… [has] overwhelmed this deserving class with indescribable misery. Multitudes of them gave up the commonest articles of food, — coffee, tea, butter, and sugar, — and others dispensed even with many of the actual necessaries. How could they eat butter at sixty cents a pound, when earning only fifteen cents a day?”

12. “An Act to Further Provide for the Public Defense,” April 16, 1862, Acts of the first Congress of the Confederate States. Statute I, edited by James M. Mathews, Public Laws of the Confederate States of America Passed at the First Session of the First Congress, Richmond, VA (R.M. Smith, Printer to Congress, 1862,) 29- 32. This Act technically called up all white citizens between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five for three years or the duration of the war. It was later modified to exempt certain categories of workers based upon war time need or community requirements (i.e., teachers, doctors, ministers, or government workers.) Later revisions to the law also exempted some groups of skilled workers needed by the war effort such as textile mill workers.

13. Wilson, Harold S., “Virginia’s Industry and the Conduct of the War in 1862,” Virginia at War 1862, edited by William C. Davis and James I. Robertson Jr., Lexington, KY (University Press of Kentucky 2007) 28. See also Milstead, Richard M., “’All kinds of Carpenter’s work done…’ – John & George Gibson, Carpenters, Builders, and Button Makers for the Richmond Clothing Bureau,” Military Collector & Historian, Volume 74, No. 1 (Spring 2022) 83-96 (Afterward Gibsons.) The Gibson carpentry business in Richmond is a typical example illustrating the impact the war had on numerous small and medium sized Virginia enterprises. Among these was the transition of their labor force from being predominately white and family oriented into one which depended on enslaved workers as their business grew and the various Conscription Acts compelled white laborers to serve in the armed forces.

14. Wilson, Harold S., Confederate Industry - Manufacturers and Quartermasters in the Civil War, Jackson, MS (University Press of Mississippi 2002) (Afterward Confederate Industry) 64.

15. Three examples of the many of the individuals whose businesses were tied to the operations of the RCB that became prominent in post-war Virginia are: William Crenshaw, one of three brothers who established the Crenshaw Woolen mill in Richmond which provided textiles to the RCB until its destruction by fire in May 1863. He also was prominent in Blockade running activities in England, owning several vessels transporting goods for the Confederate government. After the war, he was the largest landed farmer in Orange County before becoming the president of a saltpeter mine in Louisa County. (William Graves Crenshaw obituary, Alexandria Gazette, 25 May 1897); James B. Pace, ran the Danville Manufacturing Company which also produced woolen goods for the RCB. Following the war, Pace moved to Richmond and went into the tobacco business, starting J.B. Pace Tobacco. He became one of the wealthiest men in the south with a net worth of $2,000,000 by 1882. In 1884 Pace had established himself in banking, serving as President of Planter's National Bank. He was elected Richmond City Treasurer in 1905, a position he held until his death in 1920. (National Register of Historic Places – Registration form for the James B. Pace House in Richmond Virginia); With the war’s end John and George Gibson resumed their commercial carpentry and building business in Richmond. In 1875 John retired, passing away in 1885. George continued to run the business with his younger brother, William, working until his death at the age of 91 in 1908. (Gibsons). There is still a Gibson construction and consulting company operating in Richmond today.

16. Arliskas, Thomas M., Cadet Gray and Butternut Brown, Gettysburg, PA (Thomas Publications, 2006) 5-7.

17. Milstead, Richard M., “‘Labors of the Loom’- Domestic Woolen Fabric Production for the Confederate Richmond Clothing Bureau, 1861-1865,” Military Collector & Historian, Volume 72, No. 3 (Fall 2020), 271- 287 (Afterward Labors of the Loom).

18. The number of Clothing Bureaus and their locations fluctuated during the war somewhat in response to Federal incursions into the South. In his letter to the editor of the Richmond Whig, Captain Ferguson specifically named eight Clothing Bureaus then operating across the South. (Ferguson letter to the Whig). The following March Quartermaster General Meyers set letters to Assistant Quartermasters commanding fourteen separate Clothing Bureaus requesting they provide him with their status and projections for each bureau’s garment production in the year starting 1 April 1863. (Letter A.C. Meyers to Clothing Bureau Commanders, 12 March 1863, Records of the Quartermaster Department, NAMP M410, WDCCR RG 109, NARA, Washington, D.C.) As the war progressed some locations mentioned by both, like Knoxville TN came under Union control and their operations moved or taken over by other locations in Confederate territory

19. Gibsons

20. Jensen Part 1, 112-113.

21. Waugh, Norah, The Cut of Men’s Cloths – 1600-1900, New York, NY (Routledge – Taylor & Francis Group, 1964), 112-113.

22. Ibid.,

23. Brown, William L., III, Thoughts on Men’s Shirts in America 1750- 1900, Gettysburg, PA (Thomas Publications 1999), 7-11.

24. Dickson, Ephriam D., III, “The Mystery of the U.S. Army’s Pattern 1839 (Type 3) Forage Cap,” Military Collector & Historian, Vol. 73, No. 3 (Fall 2021), 209 -210. See also Risch, Ema, Quartermaster Support for the Army, a history of the Corps 1775-1939, Center of Military History, United States Army; CMH Pub 70-35, 1989, 348.

25. Sewing machines were relatively common in the Richmond region starting in the mid 1850’s often with private ownership. In the 1860 Richmond City Business Directory seven firms were listed as selling and repairing such machines. (Richmond business directory and merchants and manufacturers' advertiser; 1860, Charlottesville, VA (University of Virginia Library)). At least one firm in Richmond, the Union Manufacturing Company, also made and serviced sewing machines there during the war. Extensive receipts for the company’s machines and services (repairs, parts, etc.) with the Confederate Ordinance Department in the City do exist but none have been found with the Quartermaster’s Department. (Records for the Union Manufacturing Company, “Confederate Papers Relating to Citizens or Business Firms, 1861 – 1865,” NAMP M346 Roll 1048, WDCCR RG 109, NARA, Washington, D.C. (Afterward Union Mfg.)

26. Labors of the Loom.

27. Ibid. English fabric for uniforms is known to have been imported into the Confederacy as early as 1861, but the Quartermaster’s Department did not have a dedicated purchasing agent in Britain until late 1862. The earliest shipments from his activities began to arrive in the spring of 1863 and while some very substantial quantities arrived in the second half of that year, not until the beginning of 1864 did the flow of such material become the predominant source for construction of uniforms at the RCB as the level of domestic textile they received dropped. Of the eighteen jackets in the study group, seven are believed to have been made before July 1863 and three other examples believed made before that date, but not studied, are known to the author. Of the combined group, half (5) were made from English woolen fabrics and the other half made from domestically produced wool-on-cotton fabric dyed with logwood or vegetable dyes. What is believed to be the earliest RD jacket in the study, the John J. Haines jacket, is made from blue-gray, English kersey fabric comparable to that found ones from late in the war. Based upon Haines service record, he is believed to have received it sometime between September and December 1862 before being severely wounded at the Battle of Fredericksburg.

28. Gibsons.

29. Union Mfg.- The Quartermaster’s Department bought large quantities of bone buttons made by them for trousers and shirts especially in 1864.

30. Shipping Book, Richmond Clothing Depot, 1863‑1865, Chapter V, Vol. 218, WDCCR RG 109, NARA, Washington, D. C., ledger sheet 78. The “Shipping Book” is a ledger of materials received at the RCB for its production operations between 1 October 1863 and 31 March 1865. On 5 August 1864 of 1080 gross metal pants buttons and 250 gross metal shirt buttons were received in a large shipment from England.

31. Caldwell, J.F.J, The History of a Brigade of South Carolinian; Known First As "Gregg's," And Subsequently As "McGowan's Brigade, Philadelphia, PA (King & Baird Printers, 1866), 70

32. Hale, Laura V. and Stanley S. Phillips, History of the Forty-ninth Virginia Infantry C.S.A. “Extra Billy Smith's Boys”, Lanham, MD (S.S. Phillips and Associates, 1981), 134. This work is based upon the unpublished memoirs of Captain Robert Daniel Funkhouser, ‘Warren Blues,’ Company D, 49th Virginia Infantry.

33. Records for Richard J Reid, Compiled Service Records of Confederate Soldiers who Served in Organizations from the State of Virginia, NAMP M324, roll 0920. WDCCR RG 109. NARA, Washington D.C. A single shipment of over 56,000 yards English “Army cloth” from the blockade runner Venus received in Richmond in July 1863, provided uniform fabric used to make over 20,000 “suits of clothing” issued to soldiers in the ANV during the fall of 1863 (Labors of the Loom, 275.)

34. Barclay Letters, 83.

35. Jones. J. B., A Rebel War’s Clerk Diary - Vol 2, Edited by James L. Robertson, Lawrence, KS (University Press of Kansas 2015,) 298.

36. "Resources of the Confederacy in February 1865", Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 1876), 117‑120. (Afterward Lawton Report to Congress)

37. “Report of the Special Committee on the Pay and Clothing of the Army,” Proceedings of the Confederate States House of Representatives, 11 February 1865, Durham, NC (Duke University Library), Conf Pam #289, 5.

38. “’An Act to Provide for the Public Defense’, Sections 3&4, 6 March 1861,” War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the Official Records for the Union and Confederate Armies, Series IV, Vol I, Washington DC (Government Printing Office 1888-1904,) 126. At the beginning of the war the Confederate Quartermaster’s Department was unable to supply sufficient uniform clothing for the initial 100,000 volunteers requested from the states by President Jefferson Davis in response to the initiation of armed conflict with the United States .The “commutation system” was designed to shift responsibility for provisioning soldier’s clothing from the Central Confederate Government to the soldiers themselves (or to the states) by supplying cash payments in lieu of garments, having the soldiers procure it on their own. It was based upon a practice initiated by the U.S. Government in the Mexican War under similar circumstances. Both failed miserably in the purpose for which they were intended.

39. “An Act to repeal the law authorizing commutation for soldiers' clothing and to require clothing to be furnished by the Secretary of War in kind”. October 8, 1862, Acts of the first Congress of the Confederate States. Statute II – 1862, edited by James M. Matthews, Public Laws of the Confederate States of America, Passed at the Second Session of the First Congress 1862, Richmond VA (R.M. Smith, Printer to Congress 1862) (Afterward Statute II,) 69.

40. Bohannon, Keith S., “Dirty, Ragged, and Ill-Provided For- Confederate Logistical Problems in the 1862 Maryland Campaign and Their Solutions,” The Antietam Campaign, edited by Gary W. Gallagher, Chapel Hill, NC (University of North Carolina Press 1999) 101 – 142. In his essay, Bohannon points out the issues in supply of the ANV during the Antietam campaign resulting from the ad hock arrangements created by the commutation system exasperated by the rigors of its movements in summer 1862. In his discussion of solutions after its repeal (130 -132,) he describes changes made by Quartermaster General A. C. Meyers to improve his department’s efficiency and the flow of clothing to field AQMs for issue to the army.

41. Confederate Industry, 29 – 34.

42. McPherson, James M., War on the Waters - the Union and Confederate Navies, 1861-1865, Chapel Hill, NC (University of North Carolina Press 2012,) 70 – 95. McPherson provides an excellent discussion of Union efforts starting early in 1862 to control the Mississippi River beginning with the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson and the City of New Orleans which disrupted the flow of supplies between Texas and the other states in the Confederacy by the middle of the year. Final Federal control of the entire river was not achieved until July 1863 with the surrender of Vicksburg (4 July) and Port Hudson (9 July) largely isolating Texas altogether.

43. “An Act to Provide Shoes for the Army,” October 9, 1862, Statute II, 72. This Congressional Act authorized the Quartermaster’s Department to detail 2,000 shoemakers from the army into service producing shoes.

44. Confederate Industry, 176.

45. Lawton Report to Congress. These numbers do not include army clothing manufactured by North Carolina and issued out of its own Richmond warehouse/depot in the same period to that state’s troops in Lee’s army, also summarized in Lawton’s report (21,301 jackets, 32,104 trousers, 23,354 cotton shirts, 22,519 drawers. 9,263 pairs of shoes, 6,696 blankets, and 200 overcoats.) North Carolina continued to produce clothing for its own troops through state run manufacturing operations after repeal of the commutation law in 1862. Furthermore, clothing made by Georgia also was known to have been issued during the year of 1864 but precise numbers in the specific time period could not be identified.

46. Daily Richmond Examiner, (John M. Daniel, Editor, Richmond, VA) 27 March 1864. In an article, the Examiner reported on a visit by General Lee to the RCB shoe manufacturing facility, stating that he observed approximately 200 “detailed men” at work producing 600 pairs of shoes each day for the army. At such a production rate, given that raw materials (leather) were available, this would equate to more than 100,000 pairs produced there during the six + months included in the period Lawton reported. Actual RCB shoe production records are not available.

47. Taylor, Walter H., Four Years with General Lee, New York, NY (D. Appleton & Company 1878), 183

48. Dugdale, Jeff, Never in Rags Volume 1 The East 1863, Luton, Bedfordshire, UK (Military Press 2015). Dugdale has extensively searched the Confederate Consolidated Service Record (CSR) files contained in RG 109 at the National Archives for discrete requisitions and other documentation relating to actual issue of clothing made in the field by AQMs and company officers to units in the ANV. His work is the first truly comprehensive survey of the types and quantity of clothing issued to that army actually derived from surviving period records that document what enlisted personal were actually receiving throughout the pivotal year of 1863. The title of his work appropriately summarizes the conclusions of his investigations.

49. Jensen Part 1, 109

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Confederate Industry. Wilson’s work is recommended for “in depth” understanding of Southern industry during the war, its interactions with the Confederate Army Quartermaster’s Department, and how both responded to the challenges they faced between 1861 and 1865, the successes as well as the ultimate failures. Many points touched on within this paper are discussed in depth for the entire Confederacy. Wilson also discusses the government’s foreign interactions, policy mistakes, and the politics that surrounded the “supplies war” fought on the home front. He concludes with a look at the aftermath of the war on the Southern industrial complex and the forging of the “New South.”